Saving Oklahoma\u27s  Save Our State  Amendment: Sharia Law in the West and Suggestions to Protect Similar State Legislation from Constitutional Attack by Rosato, Steven M.
ROSATO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014 12:23 PM 
 
659 
SAVING OKLAHOMA’S “SAVE OUR STATE” AMENDMENT: 
SHARIA LAW IN THE WEST AND SUGGESTIONS TO 
PROTECT SIMILAR STATE LEGISLATION FROM 
CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK 
Steven M. Rosato* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, an increasing number of states have introduced 
bills and constitutional amendments seeking to ban or limit the use 
of Sharia or international law in state court decisions.1  While the 
overwhelming majority of such bills have failed to achieve passage,2 
Oklahoma succeeded in 2010 in passing a state constitutional 
amendment popularly known as the “Save Our State” Amendment 
(the “Amendment”), which sought to ban state courts from 
considering international law in general and Sharia Law in 
particular.3  The Amendment passed decisively by referendum on 
November 2, 2010, with voter approval over 70%.4 
Shortly thereafter, Muneer Awad (a Muslim resident of 
Oklahoma) challenged the Amendment in U.S. District Court on the 
grounds that it violated both the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  Awad obtained a 
preliminary injunction to prevent certification of the election result.5  
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2009, Hamilton 
College.  The author would like to thank Professor Ronald Riccio for his valuable 
input on this Comment.  In addition, I would like to thank my fellow Editors who 
worked so hard to prepare this Comment for publication.  Finally, a special thanks to 
Dr. Irfan al-Alawi and the Center for Islamic Pluralism, without whose work this 
Comment would be incomplete. 
 1  See Asma T. Uddin & Dave Pantzer, A First Amendment Analysis of Anti-Sharia 
Initiatives, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363, 370 (2012). 
 2  Id. at 371. 
 3  H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010), available at 
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf. 
 4  Oklahoma “Sharia Law Amendment”, State Question 755 (2010), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/ 
index.php/Oklahoma_%22Sharia_Law_Amendment%22,_State_Question_755 
(2010). 
 5  See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff’d, 670 F.3d 
ROSATO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014  12:23 PM 
660 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:659 
 
The State appealed the District Court’s ruling to the Tenth Circuit, 
which affirmed the injunction, holding that the Amendment violated 
the Establishment Clause, but the court declined to reach the 
question of whether the Amendment also violated the Free Exercise 
Clause.6  While the Tenth Circuit’s result may be correct in this 
particular case, it is important to understand the complex reasons 
why state legislatures across the United States continue to propose 
measures very similar to the “Save Our State” Amendment.  This 
perceived backlash against Sharia should not merely be dismissed as 
an “Islamophobic” reaction of close-minded individuals in the wake 
of 9/11; to do so would ignore real and ominous developments in 
Western countries with significant Muslim populations. 
Sharia is generally defined as “[t]he body of Islamic religious law 
applicable to police, banking, business, contracts, and social issues.”7  
While this general definition introduces the very basic concept that 
Sharia seeks to govern a wide array of societal and economic 
interactions, it fails to capture the distinctions made among various 
Islamic countries and sects.8  The nuances of Sharia will be developed 
more fully below, but the fact that there exist differing 
interpretations of Sharia is introduced here simply to emphasize that 
there is not a single, definitive interpretation of Sharia in the Muslim 
world. 
Muslim practitioners in Islamic countries have developed Sharia 
law along two separate tracks.9  On one track is the traditional 
conception of Sharia as a personal guide for believers; that is, the 
application of Sharia is “limited to religious observance by Muslims, 
and elements of family law.”10  This particular form of Sharia, which 
deals mostly with personal behavior, is purely voluntary among 
 
1111 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 6  See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 7  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1501 (9th ed. 2011). 
 8  For example, there exist five distinct schools of thought on the interpretation 
of Sharia: the Hanafi school (the most liberal and most influential), the Maliki 
school, the Shafi’i school, the Hanbali school, and the Jafari school (practiced by the 
majority of Shia Muslims).  Toni Johnson & Lauren Vriens, Islam: Governing Under 
Sharia, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 9, 2013), 
http://www.cfr.org/religion/islam-governing-under-sharia/p8034.   
 9  DR. IRFAN AL-ALAWI ET AL., CTR. FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM, A GUIDE TO SHARIAH 
LAW AND ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY IN WESTERN EUROPE 2007-2009 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.islamicpluralism.org/documents/shariah-law-islamist-ideology-western-
europe.pdf [hereinafter A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW]. 
 10  Id. 
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adherents in Western countries.11  Moreover, the traditional 
conception of Sharia directs followers living in Western countries to 
“obey the laws and customs of the land to which they move, and to set 
a good example to their non-Muslim neighbors.”12  Indeed, prior to 
the rise of more radical forms of Sharia in the twentieth century, 
Islamic adherents in Western countries rarely challenged the validity 
of Western legal systems as applied to them.13  Thus, traditional 
Sharia generally has had no impact on Western legal systems, 
although some of its applications can conflict with the Western legal 
tradition in certain areas such as family law.14  For example, it is far 
more common in the sensitive area of family law for Muslims to 
“decline Western marriage, or be prevented by Western law . . . from 
turning to Western courts regarding divorce and inheritance.”15  This 
apparent clash notwithstanding, the traditional conception of Sharia 
does not typically conflict with the legal systems of Western countries 
because it does not advocate that adherents should flout the laws of 
the non-Muslim countries in which they reside.16 
On the other track is the radical, or Islamist, conception of 
Sharia,17 which “holds that the West is an area of unbelief and that 
Muslims living in Western lands cannot obey Western laws but must 
establish their own Islamic legal standard.”18  Gaining more support 
in recent years among both Muslims and non-Muslims in Western 
countries is the idea—originated in Islamist circles—of “parallel 
Sharia,” which states that Muslims in non-Muslim countries should be 
permitted to operate a legal system in parallel with the secular legal 
system of the Western country in which they reside.19  While some 
“Islamophobes” in Western countries claim that they will eventually 
be forced to adhere to Sharia, this worry seems misplaced and 
unwarranted.  Rather, the greater emphasis should be placed on the 
specter of a legal system that forces a particular religious group to 
adhere to the tenets of religious law with no possibility of 
intervention or adjudication by the secular courts.20 
 
 11  Id. at 7. 
 12  Id. at 9. 
 13  Id. 
 14  Id. at 7–8. 
 15  A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 7–8. 
 16  Id. at 9. 
 17  Id. at 5. 
 18  Id. at 10. 
 19  Id. 
 20  Id.  
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The concept of “parallel Sharia” falls somewhere in between the 
traditional conception of Sharia, which holds that Muslims should 
obey the laws of non-Muslim countries while still adhering to the 
personal tenets of Islam, and the radical conception of Sharia, which 
holds that Muslims in non-Muslim countries should not feel 
compelled to obey the commands of the secular legal system.21  
“Parallel Sharia” calls for the establishment of a separate legal system 
in non-Muslim countries based on the laws of the Muslim faith and 
enforced by the non-Muslim secular governments themselves.22  It must be 
noted, however, that a “parallel Sharia” system would not necessarily 
include those radical elements supported by some adherents of the 
Islamist conception.23  Nevertheless, there is always the danger that 
radical elements of Sharia could be introduced into such a system.24  
Indeed, the idea of a parallel system of justice originated in radical 
circles.25  Various scholars, including some with radical beliefs, have 
euphemistically referred to “parallel Sharia” as “fiqh . . . for 
minorities,” or “a body of opinion derived from Shariah doctrine to 
govern the lives of Muslim minorities in non-Muslim lands.”26 These 
euphemisms seemingly serve to give off the appearance that the 
supporters of parallel Sharia merely seek a “reasonable 
accommodation” of their religion, when in fact the true goal of 
“parallel Sharia” is to bring Muslim minorities under an entirely 
separate legal system administered by religious authorities and 
enforced by Western governments.27 
Many Western countries have already adopted a system of 
“reasonable accommodation” of differing religious views.28  In the 
United States, for example, employment regulations promulgated in 
accordance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act specifically define 
“reasonable accommodation” and provide direction as to the manner 
in which employers falling within the purview of the Act should 
accommodate the religious views of their employees.29  “Reasonable 
accommodation” is certainly an idea ingrained in our constitutional 
system and is clearly in line with the First Amendment’s command 
 
 21  A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 15. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. at 16. 
 25  Id. 
 26  Id. 
 27  A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 17.  
 28  Id.  
 29  29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (2012). 
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that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”30  The concept 
of a parallel system of justice for a religious minority, however, would 
seem to exceed that constitutional command and foster isolation and 
separation of the minority from the rest of society.31  It seems 
axiomatic that the Establishment Clause would be violated by a 
system of law that treats individuals differently solely on the basis of 
the religion that they practice. 
Sharia law has been introduced to varying degrees in some of 
the most influential countries in Europe, including Great Britain, 
Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Spain.32  Great Britain in 
particular has seen a dramatic increase in Islamic radicalism in 
conjunction with louder calls for the establishment of “parallel 
Sharia” within its borders; in fact, the British government sanctioned 
the creation of approximately eighty Sharia courts.33  While all of 
these countries have relatively small Muslim populations—Britain’s 
Muslim population, for example, accounts for approximately 4.8% of 
the total population—there has been increasing focus on compliance 
with the tenets of Sharia in these countries.34  In addition, various 
statistics point to increasing radicalization of Muslim youth in 
Western countries such as Great Britain.35 
This Comment will examine both the constitutionality of state 
statutes or constitutional amendments that seek to ban the 
consideration of Sharia law in judicial decision-making, and potential 
alternative forms of legislation that might achieve the same goal of 
separation of church and state that state constitutional amendments 
like the “Save Our State” Amendment seek to achieve.  Part II of this 
Comment will provide background on Oklahoma’s “Save Our State” 
Amendment, along with an analysis of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in 
Awad v. Ziriax.  In order to further examine the Tenth Circuit’s 
analysis and frame the constitutional discussion of alternatives to the 
 
 30  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 31  A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 17–19. 
 32  See generally id. at 23–25. 
 33  Raheel Raza, The Rise of Sharia in the West, INT’L HUMANIST AND ETHICAL UNION 
(Mar. 15, 2012, 7:21 PM), http://iheu.org/rise-sharia-west. 
 34  Id. 
 35  Id.; Douglas Murray, It’s Official: Muslim Population of Britain Doubles, 
GATESTONE INSTITUTE (Dec. 21, 2012, 4:30 AM), 
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3511/britain-muslim-population-doubles; see 
British Muslims Poll: Key Points, BBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2007, 1:04 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6309983.stm. 
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“Save Our State” Amendment to be offered in Part V, Part III will 
examine current Supreme Court jurisprudence of both the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, which sets forth 
the parameters in which state legislation on religious issues must 
operate.  Next, Part IV will provide an in-depth background on Sharia 
law and its influence in various Western countries, ultimately arguing 
that the increasing influence of Sharia law in Western countries and 
calls for parallel systems of Sharia have been driving forces behind 
the proposal of apparently anti-Sharia legislation in state legislatures 
across the United States.  Returning to the “Save Our State” 
Amendment and similar state legislative initiatives, Part V will begin 
with a discussion of the principles of federalism and argue that states 
should be granted significant autonomy to craft rules of decision for 
their courts.  This Part will then go on to analyze various possible 
state statutes and constitutional amendments that seek to limit 
consideration of religious law in the secular courts and determine 
whether each alternative would pass constitutional muster under 
either Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause analysis.  Finally, 
Part VI will conclude by stating that regardless of one’s views on the 
advisability of state constitutional amendments or statutes seeking to 
ban consideration of religious doctrine in state court, so long as those 
amendments or statutes do not run afoul of the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment, states should be free to craft rules of decision 
for their courts if they deem it to be of sufficient necessity to do so. 
II. OKLAHOMA’S “SAVE OUR STATE” AMENDMENT AND AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN AWAD V. ZIRIAX 
A. The “Save Our State” Amendment 
The Oklahoma House of Representatives originally introduced 
the “Save Our State” Amendment as a House Joint Resolution on 
January 11, 2010.36  The stated purpose of the resolution was to “make 
courts rely on federal and state laws when deciding cases.”37  An 
Oklahoma House News Release provides a glimpse into the thinking 
of Oklahoma politicians as to the reasons why the Amendment was 
necessary.  In the Release, Representative Rex Duncan said: 
 
 36  Okla. B. History, 2010 Reg. Sess. H.J. Res. 1056, available at 
http://newlsb.lsb.state.ok.us/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=HJR1056&Session=1000. 
 37  H.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010), available at 
http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/cf_pdf/200910%20INT/hres/HJR1056%20INT 
.PDF. 
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Oklahomans should not have to worry that their rights 
could be undermined by foreign court rulings in countries 
that do not have our respect for individual liberty and 
justice for all.  Unfortunately, some judges in other states 
and on the federal bench have begun to cite international 
law in their court decisions, creating the need for this 
constitutional amendment.38 
Based on this quote, one could infer that Oklahoma politicians 
were largely concerned with the possibility that the state’s judges 
might attempt to rest their decisions on international law and sought 
to prevent that from happening.  Both the Oklahoma House and 
Senate eventually passed the Joint Resolution almost unanimously on 
May 18, 2010, and May 24, 2010, respectively.39 
The relevant text of the Amendment, as adopted by the 
Oklahoma Legislature, is as follows: 
The Courts . . . shall uphold and adhere to the law as 
provided in the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma 
Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations 
promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law, 
the Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated thereto, and 
if necessary the law of another of the United States provided 
the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in making 
judicial decisions.  The courts shall not look to the legal 
precepts of other nations or cultures.  Specifically, the courts 
shall not consider international law or Sharia Law.  The 
provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before 
the respective courts, including, but not limited to, cases of 
first impression.40 
Thus, the language of the Amendment specifically mentioned 
“Sharia Law” twice.  Following revisions of the Ballot Question by the 
Attorney General, the Amendment was put up for referendum as 
State Question 755 to Oklahoma voters on November 2, 2010, and 
just over 70% of voters approved it.41  The Attorney General, perhaps 
 
 38  Okla. H.R. News Release, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., April 20, 2010, available at 
http://www.okhouse.gov/Media/News_Story.aspx?NewsID=3571. 
 39  Okla. H.R. Journal, 2010 Reg. Sess. No. 62, May, 18, 2010, available at  
http://www.okhouse.gov/52LEG/okh02856.txt; Okla. S. Journal, 2010 Reg. Sess. No. 
64, May 24, 2010, available at http://www.oksenate.gov/ 
legislation/votes/votes_2010/2010_votes.aspx. 
 40  H.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010) (emphasis added), 
available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/legislation/52nd/2010/2R/HJ
/1056.pdf. 
 41  Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir. 2012). 
ROSATO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014  12:23 PM 
666 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:659 
 
unwisely as the later discussion on Sharia will demonstrate, revised 
the Ballot Question to state that “Sharia Law is Islamic Law.  It is based 
on two principal sources, the Koran and the teachings of Mohammed.”42  The 
Tenth Circuit noted that “[w]ithout intervention, the proposed 
amendment would likely have been certified on November 9, 2010.”43 
B. The Decision in Awad v. Ziriax 
On November 4, 2010, Muneer Awad, a practicing Muslim and 
the executive director of the Oklahoma Chapter of the Council on 
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), brought suit in U.S. District 
Court against the Oklahoma Election Board seeking to enjoin the 
board from certifying the Amendment’s election result.44  Mr. Awad 
argued that the Amendment violated both the Establishment Clause 
and Free Exercise Clause due to the fact that the Amendment 
explicitly singled out Islam for negative treatment.45  The district 
court issued a temporary restraining order on November 9, 2010, and 
on November 29, the court granted a preliminary injunction.46  The 
Election Board then appealed the district court’s decision on 
December 1, 2010.47 
The Tenth Circuit considered Mr. Awad’s argument that the 
Amendment violated the Establishment Clause in the context of the 
standard for granting a preliminary injunction.48  It is important to 
note that the court declined to reach Mr. Awad’s Free Exercise 
Clause claim because it found that his “Establishment Clause claim 
provide[d] sufficient grounds to uphold the preliminary 
injunction[.]”49  The court first set out to determine whether it 
should apply the Lemon test or the Larson test—the two primary 
Establishment Clause tests—in the context of this case. 
The Lemon test will be discussed in-depth in the Part III of this 
 
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. (citing Okla. State Board Election Rule § 230:35-3-91(c)). 
 44  Id. at 1118–19. 
 45  Id. at 1119. 
 46  Id. 
 47  Awad, 670 F.3d at 1119. 
 48  Id. at 1125 (quoting Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distrib., LLC, 
562 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009)) (stating that in order for the court to grant a 
preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must establish four factors: (1) substantial 
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) denial would result in irreparable injury; (3) 
the threatened injury outweighs the injury the opposing party will suffer under the 
injunction; and (4) the public interest would not be adversely affected by the 
granting of the injunction). 
 49  Id. at 1119. 
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Comment, but for the purposes of this case it is sufficient to note 
“that Lemon applies to ‘laws affording uniform benefit to all religions, 
and not to provisions . . . that discriminate among religions.’”50  Thus, 
the test would seem to apply only in instances where the law at issue 
does not single out a religion for disparate treatment, which would, 
of course, make it inapposite for application in Awad. The Larson test 
will also be discussed in greater detail below, but the Tenth Circuit 
noted that Larson applies when “a law discriminates among religions,” 
and a law that does so will “survive only if it is ‘closely fitted to the 
furtherance of any compelling interest asserted.’”51  In other words, if 
a law discriminates against a particular religion, the traditional rubric 
of strict scrutiny commonly used in Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause analysis applies. 
The Tenth Circuit held that the Larson test applied, and rejected 
the Election Board’s arguments that Larson was not good law in light 
of the fact that it is rarely used or, in the alternative, was not 
applicable to the facts of this case.52  In response to the Election 
Board’s first argument, the court stated that “Larson’s rare use likely 
reflects that legislatures seldom pass laws that make ‘explicit and 
deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations’ as 
contemplated in Larson.”53  As to the second argument, Judge 
Matheson concluded that the Amendment clearly discriminated 
against Islam.54  The Election Board argued that the Amendment only 
named Sharia law as an example and that the law’s primary purpose 
was to ban Oklahoma courts from considering any religious law in 
their decisions.55  Judge Matheson, however, pointed to the 
Amendment’s plain language, which explicitly provided that state 
court judges are forbidden from considering the law of any state that 
includes Sharia law, “but does not prohibit Oklahoma courts from 
upholding and adhering to laws of other states that include the laws 
of any other religion.”56  The Election Board argued in the alternative 
that the use of the word “culture” in the Amendment was meant to be 
synonymous with “religion,” and therefore that the amendment 
 
 50  Id. at 1126 (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982)) (emphasis in 
original). 
 51  Id. at 1127 (quoting Larson, 456 U.S. at 255). 
 52  Id. 
 53  Awad, 670 F.3d at 1127 (quoting Larson, 456 U.S. at 247 n.23). 
 54  Id. at 1128. 
 55  Id. 
 56  Id. at 1128–29. 
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sought to ban consideration of all religious laws.57  Judge Matheson 
rejected this argument as well, stating that even if that were the case, 
the Amendment would still purportedly permit judges to consider 
religious laws or precepts that are part of Oklahoma culture.58 
Finding that Larson’s strict scrutiny test applied, Judge Matheson 
then went on to analyze the Amendment under the test.59  The first 
prong of the strict scrutiny test requires that the State demonstrate a 
compelling interest.60  In order to do so, the government must 
demonstrate a real, identifiable harm that it is seeking to rectify; 
“overly general statements of abstract principles do not satisfy the 
government’s burden to articulate a compelling interest.”61  Judge 
Matheson found that the government failed to show a compelling 
interest because it included only one sentence in its supplemental 
brief on the issue, which simply stated that “Oklahoma certainly has a 
compelling interest in determining what law is applied in Oklahoma 
courts.”62  The court found that the government did “not identify any 
actual problem the challenged amendment seeks to solve.”63  Moreover, 
Judge Matheson noted that the government failed to identify any 
concrete example of a case in which an Oklahoma judge applied 
Sharia or international law, “let alone that such applications or uses 
had resulted in concrete problems in Oklahoma.”64  Therefore, the 
court concluded that the government had not asserted a compelling 
state interest.65  Even though the court’s finding on the compelling-
interest prong of the test mooted the need to consider whether the 
law was narrowly tailored (the second prong of the test), Judge 
Matheson observed that “the amendment’s complete ban of Sharia 
law is hardly an exercise of narrow tailoring.”66 
In the final analysis, it would appear that the Tenth Circuit was 
correct in affirming the district court’s grant of the preliminary 
injunction.  Judge Matheson’s decision to apply the Larson test, rather 
than the Lemon test, was well reasoned because the explicit singling 
 
 57  Id. at 1129. 
 58  Id.  
 59  Awad, 670 F.3d at 1129. 
 60  Id.  
 61  Id. at 1130. 
 62  Id. (quoting Supplemental Brief of Appellants at 16, Awad, 670 F.3d 1111 (No. 
10-6273)).  
 63  Id.  
 64  Id. 
 65  Awad, 670 F.3d at 1130. 
 66  Id. at 1131. 
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out of Sharia law rendered the “Save Our State” Amendment fatally 
flawed.  In light of that explicit discrimination, the court had no 
choice but to apply the Larson test.67  With respect to Judge 
Matheson’s application of strict scrutiny, the analysis seems to be 
accurate as to whether the government asserted a compelling 
interest.  It is difficult to argue that the single sentence included by 
the government in its brief68 is sufficient to state a compelling 
interest.  In the abstract, the government’s interest in setting up the 
rules of decision for its courts is certainly a compelling one,69 but the 
government utterly failed to point to any concrete problem that it was 
seeking to solve.  The government could have, at the very least, 
pointed to cases in other states’ courts or at the federal level that 
used or considered religious law or the legal precepts of other 
nations in rendering a decision.  Therefore, it seems fairly clear that 
the statute fails to pass constitutional muster under the Larson test. 
III. SUPREME COURT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND FREE EXERCISE 
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
For the purposes of ensuring a full and fair analysis of alternative 
forms of state statutes or constitutional amendments that achieve the 
same goals as the “Save Our State” Amendment, it is important to 
flesh out the current state of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the 
realm of both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.  
The alternatives to be proposed in Part V below might implicate one 
or the other (or both), and each alternative will be analyzed within 
the framework laid out in this Part. 
A. The Establishment Clause 
The Lemon Test, which is one of the most well-known tests used 
by the Court when considering statutes that provide benefits to 
religion and religious organizations, was set forth in the 1971 case of 
Lemon v. Kurtzman.70  The case involved challenges to statutes in 
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania that provided state aid or benefits to 
nonpublic schools, including ones that were religiously affiliated.71  
The Rhode Island statute provided salary supplementation to 
nonpublic school teachers that taught secular subjects, while the 
 
 67  See id. at 1126–27. 
 68  Id. at 1130. 
 69  Id. (stating that “Oklahoma’s asserted interest is a valid state concern.”). 
 70  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 71  Id. at 606. 
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Pennsylvania statute provided for reimbursement of teachers’ 
salaries, textbooks, and other materials only for courses related to 
secular subjects.72 
The test set forth by the Lemon Court consists of three separate 
prongs: (1) the Court must consider whether the challenged statute 
has a secular legislative purpose;73 (2) the statute’s “principal or 
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion”;74 and (3) “the statute must not foster ‘an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.’”75 As to the Rhode Island 
statute, the Court determined that because the government would 
have to continually oversee the operations of subsidized teachers to 
ensure that those teachers were not injecting their religious views 
into the classroom, there was impermissible entanglement between 
the government and these religiously affiliated schools.76  In the case 
of the Pennsylvania statute, the Court similarly found that “the very 
restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure that teachers play a 
strictly non-ideological role give rise to entanglements between 
church and state.”77  Moreover, the fact that the statute involved 
direct aid to religiously affiliated schools pointed to a finding of 
excessive entanglement.78 Accordingly, the Court determined that 
both the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes were 
unconstitutional because they violated the third prong of the test—
that is, they represented “excessive entanglement between 
government and religion.”79 
In contrast to the Lemon test, the Larson test, as set forth in 
Larson v. Valente, applies in cases in which a statute discriminates 
among different religions.80  The case involved a Minnesota statute 
that required religious organizations receiving less than fifty percent 
of total contributions from members or related organizations to 
register with the Minnesota Department of Commerce and file a 
detailed annual disclosure.81  All other religious organizations were 
 
 72  Id. at 606–07. 
 73  Id. at 612. 
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. at 612–13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
 76  See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 618–20. 
 77  Id. at 620–21. 
 78  Id. at 621. 
 79  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614. 
 80  Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982).  
 81  Id. at 230–31. 
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exempt from the reporting and registration requirements.82  The 
Court began its analysis with an important observation: “The clearest 
command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious 
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”83 
From this general principle, the Court ultimately determined 
that “when [the Court is] presented with a state law granting a 
denominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat the 
law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its 
constitutionality.”84  The Court did briefly discuss the Lemon test, 
stating that the third prong—excessive entanglement—was most 
directly implicated in the case for substantially similar reasons as 
those presented in Lemon itself.85  Ultimately, however, the Court 
determined that the law was not narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling government interest, and hence that it failed to pass 
constitutional muster under strict scrutiny analysis.86  The Court 
found the government’s asserted interest in rooting out fraud to be 
unconvincing.87 
B. The Free Exercise Clause 
While the Court has analyzed cases under the Free Exercise 
Clause in various contexts, this subpart will focus on one particular 
class of laws: neutral laws of general application. Neutral laws of 
general application are those laws that do not expressly implicate any 
religion and are intended to apply in any setting, regardless of one’s 
religious views.88  The Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence in 
the context of neutral laws of general application is somewhat 
muddled, as the description of the cases below will demonstrate. 
One of the leading cases in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, 
Braunfeld v. Brown, held Pennsylvania’s Sunday closing law to be 
constitutionally permissible even though it placed additional 
economic burdens on Orthodox Jewish business owners whose 
religion required them to close their businesses on Saturdays, as 
 
 82  Id. at 231–32. 
 83  Id. at 244. 
 84  Id. at 246. 
 85  See id. at 251–54. 
 86  Larson, 456 U.S. at 255. 
 87  See id. 
 88  See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879–80 (1990), superseded by statute, 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 103-334, § 2, 108 Stat. 3123 
(1994). 
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well.89  These business owners argued that the statute violated the 
Free Exercise Clause because they would be forced to incur 
significant economic losses while adherents to other faiths, such as 
Christianity, would be given a considerable advantage.90  The Court 
noted that the Sunday closing law at issue did “not make unlawful any 
religious practices of appellants; the Sunday law simply regulates a 
secular activity and, as applied to the appellants operates so as to 
make the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive.”91  
Moreover, the Court stated that legislatures could not possibly be 
expected to avoid enacting any “law regulating conduct that may in 
some way result in an economic disadvantage to some sects and not 
to others because of the special practices of the various religions.”92  
As a result, the Court upheld Pennsylvania’s Sunday closing law.93  
Accordingly, it is important to note that laws that do not necessarily 
prohibit one from practicing his or her religion will usually be 
deemed constitutional. 
In another seminal case, Sherbert v. Verner, which seems in direct 
conflict with the holding in Braunfeld, the Court held 
unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to a woman 
who was fired from her job for refusing to work on her day of 
Sabbath and subsequently refused to take other jobs for substantially 
the same reason.94  The Court, in applying a form of strict scrutiny, 
found that the denial of benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause.95  
Specifically, Justice Brennan put forth a balancing test, stating that 
“governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice 
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.”96  The 
Court did not expressly overrule Braunfeld, even though the dissent 
argued that “the decision necessarily overrules Braunfeld v. Brown.”97  
Justice Brennan sought to distinguish the case from Braunfeld, noting 
that the State in that case had “a strong state interest in providing 
one uniform day of rest for all workers[,]” and that it would not have 
been administratively feasible to exempt those whose faith required 
 
 89  See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
 90  Id. at 601–02. 
 91  Id. at 605. 
 92  Id. at 606. 
 93  Id. at 609. 
 94  See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 95  See id. at 403–10. 
 96  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990) (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402–
03).  
 97  Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 421 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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that Saturday be their day of rest.98  Justice Brennan seemed to take 
issue with the apparent conditioning of employment benefits on 
one’s religious beliefs, which he held to “effectively [penalize] the 
free exercise of [appellant’s] constitutional liberties,”99 and found 
that the State’s interest in this case in preventing fraudulent claims 
for unemployment benefits was not sufficiently compelling.100  
Despite Justice Brennan’s attempt to distinguish Braunfeld, however, 
the ultimate results in these two cases seem difficult to square.  Both 
cases concerned a law generally applicable to all citizens that placed 
an economic cost on the exercise of one’s religion, yet they reached 
diametrically opposite results. 
In a third case, the Court extended a religious exemption to 
Amish families allowing them to opt out of the state’s compulsory 
school attendance statute.101  In his opinion for the Court, Chief 
Justice Burger balanced the religious interests of Amish parents in 
removing their children from secular schools against the state’s 
interest in ensuring that all students attended school until age 
sixteen.102  Ultimately, he found that the Amish parents’ interests in 
directing their children’s religious upbringing outweighed the 
interest of the state in requiring these Amish children to attend 
school for, at most, two additional years.103  Chief Justice Burger 
seemed to employ a standard of review akin to strict scrutiny, stating 
that “when the interests of parenthood are combined with a free 
exercise claim . . . more than merely a reasonable relation to some 
purpose within the competency of the State is required to sustain the 
validity of the State’s requirement under the First Amendment.”104  
Although the Court acknowledged the state’s strong interest in 
providing for compulsory school attendance, the Court stated that 
because of the Amish parents’ strong showing of the adverse effect of 
the compulsory attendance law on the practice of their religious 
beliefs, the burden shifted to the State “to show with more 
particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory 
education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to 
the Amish.”105  Because the State was unable to do so, the Court 
 
 98  Id. at 408–09.  
 99  Id. at 406. 
 100  See id. at 409. 
 101  See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 102  See id. at 215–36. 
 103  Id. at 234–36. 
 104  Id. at 233 (internal quotations omitted). 
 105  Id. at 236. 
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exempted the Amish from this generally applicable law, while leaving 
the law intact.106 The result in this case seems to be fairly consistent 
with that reached in Sherbert and further supports the notion that 
under certain circumstances, a religious group may be granted an 
exemption from a neutral law of general application upon a strong 
showing of the adverse effects of that law on that group’s religious 
beliefs. 
In a later case, however, the Court declined to extend a religious 
exemption to an Oregon law prohibiting the ingestion of peyote.107  
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
Smith, the respondents were fired from their jobs for ingesting 
peyote, and their unemployment compensation applications were 
subsequently denied upon a finding that they were disqualified from 
receiving benefits because they were fired for work-related 
misconduct.108  In his opinion, Justice Scalia distinguished this case 
from prior cases involving neutral laws of general applicability in 
which the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause barred their 
application, reasoning that those cases involved not just the Free 
Exercise Clause, but the violation of some other constitutional right, 
as well.109  Justice Scalia found that “[t]he present case does not 
present such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim 
unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right.”110  
Moreover, Justice Scalia declined to extend the analysis in Sherbert to 
the situation in Smith because the case involved conduct prohibited 
by criminal law, and not merely a dispute over employment 
compensation.111  Justice Scalia concluded his opinion by arguing 
against application of the strict scrutiny analysis employed in Sherbert 
to cases such as this one, where to do so would potentially invalidate a 
wide range of generally applicable laws and enable citizens to avoid 
criminal laws on the basis of their religious beliefs.112  Thus, while the 
Court seemed to distinguish this case from prior Free Exercise Clause 
cases, it would appear that Justice Scalia sought to limit the use of 
heightened scrutiny in Free Exercise Clause cases involving neutral 
laws of general application. 
 
 106  Id. at 235–36. 
 107  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 108  Id. at 874.  
 109  Id. at 881. 
 110  Id. at 882. 
 111  See id. at 882–85. 
 112  See id. at 886–90. 
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One final case, which may be most pertinent to the following 
discussion, involved a challenge by practitioners of the Santeria 
religion to city ordinances seeking to prohibit the ritual slaughter of 
animals—Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.113  
While the text of these ordinances may have been at least facially 
neutral, Justice Kennedy concluded that their actual purpose and 
effect was to single out the Santeria religion and suppress its religious 
practice of ritual slaughter.114  In light of that finding, Justice Kennedy 
proceeded to apply strict scrutiny and found that the law was not 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.115  
Importantly, this suggests that virtually any law, no matter how facially 
neutral or generally applicable it may appear, will likely be fatally 
flawed if there is evidence that its actual purpose was to single out a 
particular religious group for disparate treatment. 
In sum, while all of the above-mentioned cases involved 
seemingly neutral laws of general application, they reached widely 
differing results.  Based on the reasoning in these cases, it would 
appear that the determination of constitutionality is largely 
dependent upon the specific facts of each case.  This notion will be 
important when applying Free Exercise Clause analysis to the 
alternative forms of legislation to be suggested in Part V below. 
IV. A BACKGROUND ON SHARIA LAW AND THE CONCEPT OF PARALLEL 
SHARIA AND THEIR INFLUENCE IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 
A. A Background on Sharia Law 
In its most general sense, Sharia is defined as, “[t]he body of 
Islamic religious law applicable to police, banking, business, 
contracts, and social issues.”116  At its core, Sharia, which means “path” 
in Arabic, seeks first and foremost to govern “daily routines, familial 
and religious obligations, and financial dealings.”117  In addition, 
however, Sharia governs a wide variety of other behaviors, such as 
“inheritance, marriage and divorce, other moral issues, cleanliness 
and personal hygiene . . . criminal justice, and war.”118  In Islamic 
countries, Sharia has moved along two separate tracks: traditional 
 
 113  508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 114  See id. at 533–40. 
 115  See id. at 546–47. 
 116  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY1501 (9th ed. 2011). 
 117  Johnson & Vriens, supra note 8. 
 118  A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 5. 
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Sharia and radical Islamist Sharia.  Traditional Sharia is the most 
practiced form and is generally viewed as a personal guide, “limited 
to religious observance by Muslims, and elements of family law.”119 
That is, traditional Sharia generally applies “to the personal practice 
of religious observance, family issues, and finance, but not to crime or 
governance.”120 
This traditional, or personal, form of Sharia thus mainly 
concerns the regulation of only personal behaviors of Muslims and 
does not conflict with secular law.  For example, personal Sharia 
governs the products a Muslim may purchase, the foods a Muslim 
may eat, the beverages a Muslim may consume (alcohol is forbidden), 
and the manner in which a Muslim must pray or dress.121  In Western 
countries, none of these requirements are foisted upon non-Muslims, 
and Muslims themselves voluntarily adhere to the guidelines of 
Sharia law; as a result, this form of Sharia does not pose any 
meaningful threat to Western legal systems.122 
A more hotly contested area of traditional Sharia in which 
problems have arisen, however, is in the area of family law, 
particularly with respect to the disparate treatment of women in such 
matters.123  Adherents of traditional Sharia generally view matters 
related to marriage and sexual relations to be governed by religious 
law and not by secular law.124  In many cases, Muslims “may decline 
Western marriage, or be prevented by Western law . . . from turning 
to Western courts regarding divorce and inheritance.”125  In addition, 
some Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia sanction female genital 
mutilation (FGM), “honor” murders, and forced marriage and 
divorce.126  In fact, recent UN estimates show that “thousands of 
women are killed annually in the name of family honor.”127  While 
many Muslim societies have rejected FGM, it is still considered 
 
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. at 6 (emphasis added).  
 121  Id. at 7. 
 122  Id. 
 123  Johnson & Vriens, supra note 8. 
 124  A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 7. 
 125  Id. at 7–8. 
 126  Id. at 8. 
 127  Johnson & Vriens, supra note 8; Hillary Mayell, Thousands of Women Killed for 
Family “Honor”, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2002), 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2002/02/0212_020212_honorkilling 
.html.  
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mandatory in some Muslim cultures.128  Finally, a well-known example 
to those in Western countries is the disparate dress requirements 
imposed on Muslim men and women.  While both men and women 
are expected to be modest, men are not subjected to the same strict 
body covering requirements to which Muslim women must adhere.129  
These examples demonstrate only some of the ways in which there is 
potential for conflict between Western conceptions of gender 
equality and Sharia family law.130 
Generally speaking, although the above discussion demonstrates 
some tension between Western ideals and Islamic law, the 
relationship between traditional Sharia law and Western law has not 
historically been adversarial in nature.131  In fact, Muslim immigrants 
in Western countries adhering to traditional Sharia actively partake in 
the political process in their new countries.132  Moreover, these 
traditional Sharia adherents widely accept Western law, and 
traditional Sharia actually mandates that Muslims accept and abide by 
the law of the country in which they reside; if they refuse to do so, 
they are directed to leave that country for a Muslim one.133  Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, traditional Sharia does not apply to non-
Muslims; for example, non-Muslims in Western countries are not 
required in any way to adhere to the Muslim ban on consumption of 
alcohol.134  This rule of thumb applies in almost every Muslim 
country, with the exception of Saudi Arabia.135  Accordingly, any fears 
among non-Muslims in Western countries that they might be forced 
to submit to the dictates of Sharia law would seem to be largely 
unfounded. 
The radical Islamist conception of Sharia, however, is the one 
 
 128  Johnson & Vriens, supra note 8. 
 129  Islamic Dress Code, MASJID AL-MUSLIMIIN, http://www.almasjid.com/content
/islamic_dress_code (last visited April 8, 2013).  
 130  It should be noted, however, that these examples are not being pointed out to 
cast aspersions on Muslims or even to posit that they are common practices in 
Muslim societies; rather, they are only mentioned for the purpose of demonstrating 
that there do exist Muslim practices that those in Western countries would view as 
anathema to their own conceptions of justice and equality. 
 131  A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 9. 
 132  Id. 
 133  Id. 
 134  Id. 
 135  Id. at 9–10; Saudi Arabia Country Specific Information, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, 
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1012.html (last visited Apr. 17, 
2013) (“Penalties for the . . . consumption of alcohol . . . in Saudi Arabia are severe.  
Convicted offenders can expect long jail sentences, heavy fines, public floggings, 
and/or deportation.”). 
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that generates the greatest fear among non-Muslims that the Western 
legal system could one day be overtaken by Sharia principles of law.  
For the most part, radical elements of Sharia persist in very few 
Islamic countries, and adherents to radical Sharia make up a tiny 
minority of the minority Muslim populations in Western countries.136  
As stated previously, however, this Comment seeks to draw out some 
of the reasons why States would even consider adopting a law that 
would prohibit consideration of Sharia in their courts.137  Such 
legislation ostensibly seeks to attack only the most radical elements of 
Sharia; it does not seek to undermine traditional Muslim practices, 
and indeed that is the view of at least some moderate Muslims.138 
The radical conception of Sharia “holds that the West is an area 
of unbelief and that Muslims living in Western lands cannot obey 
Western laws but must establish their own Islamic legal standard.”139  
Adherents of radical Sharia call for far more than simply personal 
practice of the Muslim faith; their stated goal is to create Islamic 
States governed solely by Sharia law.140  Traditional and radical Sharia 
diverge largely in the area of family law, with the most ominous 
consequences of that divergence falling on women.141  While 
traditional Sharia certainly contradicts typical Western views with 
respect to its treatment of women on certain issues, adherents to 
radical Sharia believe that women should be further subordinated in 
society.142  Practices in Saudi Arabia serve as the best example of the 
operation of radical Sharia; the government in Saudi Arabia believes 
“that Shariah forbids women from driving vehicles, appearing in 
public without a full and loose body covering, [or] meeting with male 
non-relatives in the absence of a family member of the woman as 
chaperone . . . .”143  In addition to the poor treatment of women that 
radical Sharia adherents advocate, they have also attempted in some 
cases to impose the dictates of Sharia on non-Muslims—for example, 
 
 136  A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 10. 
 137  See supra Part I. 
 138  Raza, supra note 33 (“The ban on using Sharia law in State courts in the USA 
perfectly complies with the constitution because it bans not Islam but the violent 
interpretation of Islam.”). 
 139  Stephen Suleyman Schwartz, Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe, 
GATESTONE INSTITUTE (Sept. 24, 2009, 6:30 AM), 
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/817/shariah-law-and-islamist-ideology-in-western 
-europe. 
 140  Raza, supra note 33. 
 141  See id.  
 142  A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 10. 
 143  Id. (emphasis in original) 
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radical Sharia adherents in a number of communities in Western 
countries sought to prohibit non-Muslim neighbors from dealing in 
any business having to do with alcohol or pigs.144  Even more 
alarmingly, some in Britain alleged the existence of “no-go zones” for 
non-Muslims, in which the communities are essentially closed Muslim 
societies hostile towards non-Muslims.145 
Radical Sharia further calls on its adherents to abstain from 
Western political processes and states that Western laws against 
terrorism are not applicable to them.146  In addition, radical Sharia 
supporters “indoctrinate Muslims in the belief that adherence to 
Islamic law exempts immigrant Muslims or their offspring from 
obedience to common and criminal law in Western countries,” and 
advocate that its adherents are to disregard the social and personal 
responsibilities that they may have with non-Muslims and even with 
moderate Muslims.147 Radical Sharia adherents also believe that they 
are justified in behaving in a variety of manners that would seem 
repugnant to Western societies.148  Essentially, radical Sharia espouses 
the view that because Sharia law derives from divine sources and 
secular law does not, “secular law may be ignored or violated.”149 
Apart from their view on the invalidity of secular law, adherents 
to radical Sharia advocate for a number of oppressive policies in the 
area of family law.  For example, some supporters of radical Sharia 
apparently support the execution of homosexuals.150  Adherents also 
believe that it is permissible for a husband to beat his wife if the wife 
becomes rebellious.151  In addition, the practice of FGM seems to have 
broad support among radical Sharia adherents, and they believe that 
 
 144  Id. at 10–11. 
 145  See Macer Hall, Fury at ‘No-go’ Areas Ruled by the Fanatics, DAILY EXPRESS (Jan. 7, 
2008), http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/30614/Fury-at-No-go-areas-ruled-by-
the-fanatics; Jonathan Wynne-Jones, Bishop Warns of No-go Zones for Non-Muslims, THE 
TELEGRAPH(Jan. 6, 2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/new 
/uknews/1574694/Bishop-warns-of-no-go-zones-for-non-Muslims.html. 
 146  A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 11. 
 147  Id. 
 148  Id. (“Followers of radical Shariah also claim justification to physically degrade 
women, children, and employees, borrow money from non-Muslims without repaying 
it, contract student loans and default on them, rent property without fulfilling lease 
and other responsibilities, commit identity fraud and otherwise steal property, and 
generally defy the law followed by their neighbours, down to such simple matters as 
traffic offences.”). 
 149  Id. 
 150  Id. at 12. 
 151  A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 12. 
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the cutting of the woman’s clitoris actually promotes her health.152  
Also prevalent in radical Sharia is the concept of punishment for 
“crimes” completely disproportionate to the conduct at issue.  In 
Saudi Arabia, for example, a person found guilty of adultery is subject 
to as many as 100 lashes.153  A person caught drinking alcohol earns 
anywhere from forty to eighty lashes, and in one horrifying case, a 
Saudi man was given 4,750 lashes for having sex with his sister-in-
law.154  Even more examples of excessive punishment for “morals 
offenses” abound, but just these few examples illustrate the extreme 
views of society embraced by radical Sharia adherents.  Adherents to 
traditional Sharia have expressed concern that adherents to radical 
Sharia seek to impose this strict form of law in all Muslim countries 
and even in Muslim communities within Western societies.155 
Thus, Muslim thinking is somewhat bifurcated with respect to 
the nature of Sharia to which Muslims should adhere.  While the 
large majority of Muslims support the traditional, or personal, 
conception of Sharia, radical Sharia adherents still seem to pervade 
the landscape, and their prominence in media reporting gives the 
public the impression that their numbers and influence on Muslim 
discourse are greater than they are in reality.156  It is perhaps for this 
reason that many “Islamophobes” accord the imposition of Sharia law 
in Western countries the status of a clear and present danger, even 
though most empirical data would suggest the threat to be far less 
grave and far more remote in reality.157  In addition, the diametrically 
opposing views of traditional and radical Sharia adherents may have 
 
 152  Id. 
 153  Dr. Ahmad Shafaat, Punishment for Adultery in Islam: A Detailed Examination, 
ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES, http://www.islamicperspectives.com/stoning1.htm (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2013).  
 154  Saqr al-Amry, 4,750 Lashes, Six-Year Jail for Adultery, ARAB NEWS (Feb. 18, 2002, 
12:00 AM), http://english.arabnews.com/node/218604. 
 155  A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 15. 
 156  See, e.g., Andrew Gilligan, Islamic Extremism: So Did We Cure the Problem?, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 26, 2011, 8:34 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8475290 
/Islamist-extremism-so-did-we-cure-the-problem.html; Melanie Phillips, Londonistan: 
Radical Islam and the Disintegration of British Society, MIDDLE EAST FORUM (May 17, 
2006), http://www.meforum.org/994/londonistan-radical-islam-and-the-
disintegration.  
 157  See, e.g., British Muslims Poll: Key Points, BBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2007, 1:04 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6309983.stm.  For example, on the whole, 59% of 
British Muslims prefer British law to Sharia law versus only 28% who prefer Sharia.  
For the 16–24 year-old cohort, however, support for the imposition of Sharia rises to 
37% versus 17% support from British Muslims age fifty-five and over.  Id.  
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led to the creation of a “middle way” that is the topic of the next 
section: parallel Sharia. 
B. History and Background on Parallel Sharia 
Parallel Sharia strikes a balance between traditional Sharia and 
radical Sharia that was developed in Europe in the 20th century.158  
Parallel Sharia departs from traditional Sharia in that it advocates a 
separate legal system that Western governments would be charged 
with enforcing.159  It differs from the radical conception of Sharia 
because “it is limited to personal and family law as well as, 
increasingly, financial transactions.”160  While some have 
characterized the concept of parallel Sharia as a compromise 
between Muslim minorities and Western governments, many non-
Muslim commentators view it as merely a Trojan horse for the 
introduction of radical Sharia in their countries.161  At first glance, the 
concept of parallel Sharia seems quite benign; it simply asks that 
Muslims be permitted to live under the laws of their religion and 
requests enforcement assistance from the Western government.  But 
upon further inspection, the concept is rife with radical tinges 
because it advocates a separatist view of society in which a small 
minority lives under one set of rules while all others live under a 
different set of rules.162  Moreover, the concept of parallel Sharia 
opens the door for radicalization, “since, in a Muslim-only legal 
structure, Muslim representatives of varying orientations could gain 
authority.”163 
While parallel Sharia poses as moderation between traditional 
and radical Sharia, the concept has actually been most strongly 
advanced in radical circles, with a great deal of scholarly contribution 
to the area originating in the United States.164  Euphemistically 
termed “fiqh for minorities”—that is, Islamic legal interpretation for 
minorities—the concept of parallel Sharia is grounded in a false view 
of the history of Muslims living in non-Muslim lands.165  Taha Jabir Al-
 
 158  A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 15. 
 159  Id. 
 160  Id.  
 161  Id. at 16. 
 162  Id. 
 163  A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 16. 
 164  Id.; See, e.g., TAHA JABIR AL-ALWANI, TOWARDS A FIQH FOR MINORITIES: SOME 
BASIC REFLECTIONS (2003). 
 165  AL-ALWANI, supra note 164, at xi–xiii; A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 
17. 
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Alwani, an Iraqi-born cleric formerly residing in the United States 
and a leading proponent of parallel Sharia, claimed that Muslims 
dominated the world in antiquity and affluent Muslims traveling to 
non-Muslim lands would regularly set up mini-societies over which 
Muslim law had complete dominion, without any interference from 
Western authorities.166  This view of history is not grounded in any 
reality, but it appears to reinforce the view that Muslims living in non-
Muslim lands should not be obligated to follow the dictates of secular 
law.167 
Certainly, the concept of parallel Sharia could merely be 
accepted as a theory of reasonable accommodation of religion, and as 
such, would be perfectly acceptable in countries such as the United 
States under current constitutional jurisprudence.168  This notion, 
however, proves too simplistic.  The concept of reasonable 
accommodation has never incorporated the idea that an entire 
religious minority should be outside the purview of all secular law; 
rather, it merely posits that in certain circumstances, the law may 
bend, but not break, to a reasonable extent to accommodate one’s 
religious preferences.169  Indeed, the idea of reasonable 
accommodation can be seen in the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
discussed supra, in which the Supreme Court granted a narrow 
exemption to Amish schoolchildren by allowing them to forgo two 
extra years of mandatory schooling.170  Conversely, the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Employment Division v. Smith could be viewed as a 
judgment that permitting exemption from a generally applicable 
drug law solely because of religious beliefs would be an unreasonable 
religious accommodation.171  Parallel Sharia goes far beyond a 
reasonable accommodation of religion because it advocates a 
separatist viewpoint and would lead to further fracturing of the legal 
and social ties that bind all members of a given society together.172 
Nonetheless, advocates of parallel Sharia continue to espouse 
the view that Western acceptance of the idea would actually serve the 
twin goals of unity among the Muslim population and comity 
between Muslims and non-Muslims.173  It seems plain, however, that 
 
 166  AL-ALWANI, supra note 164, at xi. 
 167  A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 17. 
 168  Id. 
 169  See generally Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 170  See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 171  See generally Smith, 494 U.S. 872. 
 172  A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 17. 
 173  Id. at 18. 
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permitting one minority population to live under its own set of rules 
would have one of two effects: feelings of resentment and 
suspiciousness between Muslims and non-Muslims, and 
incredulousness and disillusionment with the government for 
permitting such a dual legal system to operate in a country that 
seemingly respected the rule of law.  As stated previously, an 
important aspect of the concept of parallel Sharia is the idea that 
Western governments would be charged with its enforcement.174  If a 
Western government such as the United States were indeed to 
formally adopt such a system, it would seem difficult to argue that the 
system does not violate the precept of separation of church and state 
that most view as a fundamental requirement of modern democratic 
societies. 
V. PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM AND ALTERNATIVES TO THE “SAVE OUR 
STATE” AMENDMENT 
The concept of “Our Federalism” has been an important one 
since the founding of this country.  Put simply, “Our Federalism” is 
the “recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a 
Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief 
that the National Government will fare best if the States and their 
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their 
separate ways.”175  The Founding Fathers were sensitive to the notion 
that State governments should be free to carry out their legitimate 
functions without undue interference from the federal government, 
and this notion still “occupies a highly important place in our 
Nation’s history and its future.”176  The concept of “Our Federalism” is 
perhaps most definitively embodied in the Tenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, which states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”177  Thus, 
while the Constitution prescribes the outer bounds of the function of 
the federal government, it leaves to the States any powers not 
specifically delegated to the federal government. 
Among the powers left to the states is the power to shape their 
respective judiciaries. Indeed, the broad power of the states to 
establish the nature, function, and rules of their courts has long been 
 
 174  Id. at 21. 
 175  Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
 176  Id. at 44–45. 
 177  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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recognized.178  While Article III of the United States Constitution and 
Marbury v. Madison place constraints on the ability of the Congress to 
shape the judiciary and its rules of decision (since the judiciary, and 
in particular the Supreme Court, is the final expositor of the law),179 
no such constraints exist at the State level except for those imposed 
by State constitutions or statutes.  States are free to direct the rules of 
decision of their courts without federal interference, whether 
through legislation (to the extent possible under the State 
constitution), judicial action, or through the State constitutional 
amendment process.180 
It is against this backdrop of federalism that this Comment offers 
potential alternatives to the “Save Our State” Amendment.  At their 
core, state constitutional amendments or statutes like the “Save Our 
State” Amendment are merely rules of judicial procedure because 
they seek to provide the state courts with guidance as to the law on 
which decisions should be based.181  As such, the states should be free 
to amend their state constitutions or enact legislation to force their 
judiciaries to adhere to particular rules of decision, so long as those 
amendments or statutes comport with the principles embodied in, 
and the individual rights secured by, the federal Constitution.182  
While it may be the case that the “Save Our State” Amendment was 
fatally flawed in its blatant discrimination, there is no reason why 
similar state constitutional amendments or statutes seeking to achieve 
the same goal of separation of church and state could not pass 
muster under First Amendment analysis. 
 
 178  Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30 (1879) (“It is the right of every State to 
establish such courts as it sees fit, and to prescribe their several jurisdictions as to 
territorial extent, subject-matter, and amount, and the finality and effect of their 
decisions . . . .”). 
 179  See U.S. CONST. art. III; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 180  See Erie. R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938) (“Supervision over 
either the legislative or judicial action of the states is in no case permissible except as 
to matters by the constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United 
States.  Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the 
authority of the state, and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.” (quoting 
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, J., 
dissenting))). 
 181  See H.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010) (requiring, among 
other things, Oklahoma courts to base decisions on federal and state law and 
regulations). 
 182  See Lewis, 101 U.S. at 30.  
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A. The First Alternative to the “Save Our State” Amendment: An 
Amendment or Statute That Avoids Mention of Religion Entirely 
In searching for constitutionally permissible alternatives to the 
“Save Our State” Amendment, the most obvious starting point would 
be a state constitutional amendment or statute that avoids the 
discriminatory singling out of a particular religion that proved to be 
the fatal flaw in the “Save Our State” Amendment under the Supreme 
Court’s Larson Test.183  That is, this type of state constitutional 
amendment would essentially mirror the “Save Our State” 
Amendment, with the references to Sharia stricken.  Recall the 
language of the “Save Our State” Amendment: 
The Courts . . . shall uphold and adhere to the law as 
provided in the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma 
Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations 
promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law, 
the Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated thereto, and 
if necessary the law of another state of the United States 
provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in 
making judicial decisions.  The courts shall not look to the 
legal precepts of other nations or cultures.  Specifically, the 
courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law.  The 
provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before 
the respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of 
first impression.184 
Thus, the type of state constitutional amendment proposed here 
would simply strike the italicized language above.  Arizona passed a 
statute in 2011 with language similar to that proposed in this 
alternative in that it simply prohibited enforcement of foreign laws 
conflicting with the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United 
States or with the constitution and laws of Arizona.185  As of the time 
of this writing, Arizona’s law is the only one with a similar aim as that 
of the “Save Our State” Amendment to achieve passage, and it has yet 
to be challenged in court as unconstitutional.186  In light of those 
facts, the Arizona law would be a strong model for the drafting of a 
statute that enshrines the supremacy of domestic law while avoiding 
 
 183  See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (holding that laws 
discriminating among religion will be analyzed under the rubric of strict scrutiny); 
Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1129–31 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding that the “Save Our 
State” Amendment failed to satisfy Larson’s strict scrutiny test). 
 184  H.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010) (emphasis added). 
 185  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-3101 to -3103 (2012).  
 186  Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 1, at 371. 
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the unconstitutionally discriminatory pitfalls of the “Save Our State” 
Amendment.  In assessing the effectiveness and constitutionality of a 
statute like Arizona’s, the questions to be decided will be twofold: 
first, whether the resulting language would achieve the goals of strict 
adherence to federal and state law and separation of church and state 
that the original amendment sought; and second, whether the 
resulting language would raise any other constitutional problems. 
As to the first question, while the amendment would clearly not 
have the same explicit effect as intended under the original, this 
revised amendment would certainly still enshrine the concept of the 
supremacy of state and federal law in state courthouses.  How 
necessary such an amendment would be in light of the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution and the plenary police 
powers of the state under the Tenth Amendment is not a question 
that need be decided here; it is sufficient to state that there is no 
constitutional bar to codification of common law principles, and in 
fact, state legislatures across the country routinely engage in the 
practice of codification of judge-made law.187  It must be noted, 
however, that while a law like Arizona’s would certainly avoid the 
problem of discrimination seen in the “Save Our State” Amendment, 
avoidance of that problem would come at the expense of the goal of 
explicitly codifying a ban on consideration of religious doctrine in 
judicial decision-making.188 
The more difficult question would be whether a constitutionally 
impermissible purpose in the context of the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment could still be gleaned from a statute similar to 
Arizona’s, even though the statute contains no explicit mention of 
religion.  The relevant language of the Arizona statute defines 
foreign law as “any law, rule or legal code or system other than the 
 
 187  See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-1-50 (2012) (reception statute for English 
common law); Moses v. Commonwealth, 611 S.E.2d 607, 613 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding state statute to be a codification of the common law); Putrino v. Buffalo 
Athletic Club, 624 N.E.2d 676, 677 (N.Y. 1993) (finding the imposition of liability to 
be a codification of the common law). 
 188  It is important to note that the Supreme Court has already declared that 
secular courts are prohibited from interpreting religious doctrine.  See United States 
v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).  Accordingly, it might be argued that this so-called 
“religious question doctrine” in fact obviates the need for explicit codification of a 
ban on consideration of religious doctrine in judicial decision-making.  This 
Comment does not seek to pass judgment on the possible redundancy of such 
legislation in light of the “religious question doctrine.”  Rather, this Comment simply 
examines the constitutionality of such amendments, regardless of their ultimate 
necessity. 
ROSATO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014  12:23 PM 
2014] COMMENT 687 
 
constitution, laws and ratified treaties of the United States and the 
territories of the United States, or the constitution and laws of this 
State.”189  Thus, the word “religion” appears nowhere in the statute; 
broadly interpreted, however, the “any law, rule or legal code or 
system” language could be construed to include religious doctrine.  
Of course, religious doctrines could be considered “systems” and 
religion does play an important part in a variety of legal systems 
across the globe, but it would be a tremendous leap to say that 
because the amendment mentions the word “system,” it automatically 
has some discriminatory purpose against organized religion.  
Interpreted in a way that avoids the implication of religion, this 
language could mean merely that a state court is prohibited from 
using, as principal justification for its decision in a given case, law 
deriving from another country or culture.  That is, the statute 
ostensibly permits consideration of laws deriving from another 
country or culture as persuasive, so long as those laws do not control 
the decision of the court.  Assuming for the sake of argument, 
however, that the language of the statute does imply a ban on 
consideration of religious doctrine, analysis under the Establishment 
and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment becomes 
appropriate. 
As an initial matter, it seems clear that the Larson Test would not 
apply in this context because we are not “presented with a state law 
granting a denominational preference;”190 indeed, the plain language 
of the proposed statute never mentions religion and thus could not 
possibly be construed to single out any specific religion.  Therefore, 
the more appropriate test under the Establishment Clause for the 
purposes of the proposed statute would be the three-pronged Lemon 
Test, which requires that (1) the statute have a “secular legislative 
purpose;”191 (2) the statute’s “principal or primary effect . . . neither 
advances nor inhibits religion;”192 and (3) “the statute [does] not 
foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”193 
The proposed statute would meet the first prong of the test 
because its secular purpose ostensibly would be to protect citizens of 
a given state from the application of laws inconsistent with federal or 
state law.  As a point of reference, the Arizona legislature itself 
 
 189  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3101 (2012). 
 190  Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982). 
 191  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
 192  Id. 
 193  Id. at 612–13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
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declared that its intent in passing its statute was “to protect its citizens 
from the application of foreign laws when the application of a foreign 
law will result in the violation of a right guaranteed by the 
constitution of this state or of the United States or conflict with the 
laws of this State.”194  As to the second prong, the statute’s principal or 
primary effect would simply be to force state judges to base their 
decisions on federal or state law and preclude application of foreign 
laws.  Any effect that the law might have on religion could hardly be 
considered primary or principal.  Thus, the proposed statute would 
pass the second prong of the test.  Finally, the proposed statute would 
meet the third prong of the test because it would not require 
constant policing of interactions between the state judiciary and 
religion.  Most of the policing and oversight of the state judiciary 
would be with respect to its general use of foreign law in its decision, 
with cases involving religious doctrine possibly comprising a small 
subset of cases within that larger class.  Therefore, because the 
proposed statute would contravene neither the Larson Test nor the 
Lemon Test, the statute would likely be constitutional under 
Establishment Clause analysis. 
In analyzing the proposed statute in the context of the Free 
Exercise Clause, probably the most appropriate point of departure 
for the analysis is the case of Braunfeld v. Brown, in which the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s 
generally applicable Sunday closing law even though it placed 
business owners observing a Saturday Sabbath at a decided 
disadvantage in relation to Sunday Sabbath observers.195  The aim of 
the statute proposed here is generally to ensure that state court 
judges do not base their decisions on foreign law that is inconsistent 
with state or federal law.  As such, the statute at most “imposes only 
an indirect burden on the exercise of religion”196 and does not 
specifically outlaw any religious practice.  Moreover, the proposed 
statute is only meant to apply to the state judiciary (a branch of 
government) and not to citizens generally, so it is difficult to see how 
the government could impose any substantial indirect burden on the 
citizenry’s ability to live their lives in accordance with their respective 
faiths.  Of course, the statute would indirectly affect citizens, since the 
cases that they bring in state court must necessarily be adjudicated in 
 
 194  H.B. 2064, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011), available at 
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/50leg/1r/laws/0076.pdf. 
 195  See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).  
 196  Id. at 606. 
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accordance with the statute, thus leaving open the possibility that 
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause are implicated in a given 
case involving religion.  That problem would be ameliorated, 
however, by the proposed statute’s requirement that state judges’ 
decisions be made in accordance with the United States Constitution.  
That language would presumably be meant to include not just the 
text of the Constitution itself, but also the meaning of the 
Constitution as determined by the Supreme Court.  Therefore, the 
proposed statute would not appear to endanger the citizens’ free 
exercise rights, and the statute would consequently pass 
constitutional muster under Free Exercise Clause analysis as a neutral 
law of general applicability. 
B. Another Alternative: Broad Banning of Consideration of Religious 
Law as Controlling Authority in a Given Case 
A second type of state constitutional amendment or statute 
would be one that broadly bans consideration of any religious 
doctrine or international law, but with more precise and narrow 
language than the “Save Our State” Amendment’s command that 
state courts “shall not consider international law or Sharia law.”  That 
is, the amendment or statute could broadly ban state judges from 
relying chiefly upon foreign or religious law as a basis for their 
decisions. Again, a proposed (but not passed) Arizona statute 
provides a strong model for this type of legislation.197  The proposed 
Arizona bill, known as the “Arizona Foreign Decisions Act,” begins by 
forbidding the Arizona courts from incorporating “any body of 
religious sectarian law into any decision, finding or opinion as 
controlling or influential authority.”198  The bill goes on to define 
religious sectarian law as “any statute, tenet or body of law evolving 
within and binding a specific religious sect or tribe,” including 
“Sharia law, Canon law, Halacha and Karma.”199 
Thus, the proposed statute avoids the discriminatory pitfalls of 
the “Save Our State” Amendment by providing for a blanket ban of 
consideration of any religious law in state court; the fact that the 
statute specifically mentions as examples all of the most prominent 
religious doctrines implies the statute’s intention to ban 
consideration of any religious law.  Moreover, the reach of the law is 
 
 197  See Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 1, at 373–74. 
 198  H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011), available at 
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/50leg/1r/bills/hb2582p.pdf. 
 199  Id. 
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narrowed in that it limits the ban only to situations in which the 
reasoning in a court’s decision relies primarily upon religious law.  As 
such, this type of statute would ostensibly avoid the potential injury 
raised by Mr. Awad in Awad v. Ziriax, in which he claimed that the 
“Save Our State” Amendment would prohibit a court from properly 
probating his will.200  Because probate of one’s will in accordance with 
that individual’s wishes would not be chiefly reliant upon religious 
law (one’s religious beliefs might underlie the directions contained 
within the will, but that would not be an issue for the court to 
decide), but rather upon state probate statutes, such a judicial 
proceeding would not be likely to fall within the ambit of the 
proposed statute.  This proposed statute seemingly provides a more 
robust alternative to the first statute proposed in terms of its explicit 
language regarding religion, but the question becomes whether this 
explicit ban runs afoul of the Religion Clauses. 
As with the first proposed statute, Establishment Clause analysis 
under the Larson Test would seem to be inapposite here, since the 
proposed statute does not single out any one religion for disparate 
treatment, but rather treats all religions in the exact same manner.  
Thus, analysis under the Lemon Test will be more appropriate in this 
case.  As to the first prong of the Test,201 the purpose of the proposed 
statute is certainly secular in nature, since the chief aim of the 
proposed statute is to ensure that religious law does not infect the 
state courts.  That is, the statute’s goal is to affirm and enshrine the 
separation of church and state.  With respect to the second prong, 
the question is whether the proposed statute would have the 
principal or primary effect of inhibiting religion.  Given that courts 
are already generally forbidden to interpret religious law,202 it is 
difficult to see how a statute that simply reinforces that notion by 
forbidding the use of religious law as controlling authority for a 
judicial decision would inhibit religion in any way.  Religious practice 
would not be inhibited simply because courts are forbidden from 
entertaining arguments emanating out of a religious doctrine, and in 
fact a law such as the one proposed would have the effect of leveling 
the playing field for all religions by ensuring that judicial decisions 
will not favor one religion over another.203  Thus, the proposed statute 
 
 200  Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1120 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 201  See supra Part III.A. 
 202  See supra note 188. 
 203  See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 243 (1963) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“[I]n order to give effect to the First Amendment’s 
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meets the second prong of the Lemon Test.  Finally, the third prong 
of the Lemon Test requiring that the statute not cause excessive 
entanglement between government and religion204 presents a closer 
question.  The proposed statute, however, is distinguishable from a 
statute involving, for example, interaction between government and 
religious organizations because this statute merely amounts to a state 
court procedural rule and thus will not require any monitoring of 
interactions between any apparatus of the government and religious 
institutions.  Rather, the statute would simply require monitoring of 
the behavior of state judges to ensure that they are not injecting 
religious law into their decisions.  While one could argue that this 
monitoring could amount to an entanglement between government 
and religion in the abstract, it could hardly be said to be a concrete 
entanglement of religious and governmental interests.  For that 
reason, the proposed statute should satisfy the third prong of the 
Lemon Test. 
Analysis under the Free Exercise Clause might raise 
constitutional difficulties in the context of this statute, since it does 
not neatly fit into the category of a neutral law of general application.  
In one sense, the proposed law is not neutral because it explicitly 
discusses religion.  Thus, as between religion and irreligion, the law is 
not neutral.  In another sense, however, the law is arguably neutral 
because it treats all religions in the same manner.  Neutrality, 
therefore, is in the eye of the beholder.  Accepting for the sake of 
argument that the law is, in fact, neutral, the most appropriate 
Supreme Court case on which to base analysis of the proposed statute 
under the Free Exercise Clause would likely be Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, in which the Supreme Court held a 
seemingly neutral statute to be unconstitutional because it prohibited 
a practice of ritual slaughter that could be traced to a specific 
religion.205  The question, then, is whether the proposed statute could 
be construed as having an underlying discriminatory purpose that its 
 
purpose of requiring on the part of all organs of government a strict neutrality 
toward theological questions, courts should not undertake to decide such 
questions.”). 
 204  See supra Part III.A. 
 205  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993).  One could argue that this case might also be applicable in the context of the 
first proposed alternative, but because it was a strain to find any religious motivation 
underlying that statute, application of Lukumi was strategically left for the second 
alternative.  Indeed, application of that case seems particularly appropriate where a 
law mentions all of the major world religions, but may, in fact, be targeting only one.  
That situation simply seems to more closely track the one faced in Lukumi. 
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plain language does not reveal.  As an initial matter, the proposed 
statute here is distinguishable from the statute at issue in Lukumi 
because while that statute sought to outlaw a specific practice of 
private citizens, this proposed statute simply seeks to regulate the 
conduct of the state judiciary in issuing decisions.  Therefore, there is 
no pattern of conduct attributable to a specific religious group that 
could be identified here; rather, the proposed statute functions more 
as a prophylactic measure to prevent judges from injecting religious 
doctrine into their opinions.  Moreover, in order to show an 
underlying discriminatory purpose against a certain religion, one 
would have to demonstrate that this statute is attacking known 
conduct of a particular religious group, and one would be hard-
pressed to find evidence of this kind.  The legislative findings 
appended to the proposed Arizona bill provide significant insight 
into the thinking of state legislators in possibly passing such a statute; 
those findings are replete with references to the First, Ninth, and 
Tenth Amendments, along with several other provisions of the 
federal Constitution.206  Based on the legislative findings, it would 
seem that the overall purpose of the law would be to prevent the 
establishment of law on the basis of religious sectarian law, with no 
particular view towards outlawing the practice of any specific religion.  
Indeed, the plain language of the statute specifically identifies and 
outlaws judicial reliance on the laws of any of the major world 
religions while ensuring that the list of examples provided is not 
exhaustive.207  For all of these reasons, the proposed statute would not 
be violative of the Free Exercise Clause, and therefore the law would 
likely be deemed constitutional in the context of the First 
Amendment. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In recent years, the concept of parallel Sharia has gained steam 
in Western countries as the voices of more radical Sharia adherents 
have grown louder.  While these views in no way represent the views 
of the majority of Muslims living in Western countries, they are views 
that have the support of more than just a few on the margins.  In 
light of this, several states, including Oklahoma, have attempted 
through legislation to prevent ideas such as parallel Sharia from 
 
 206  See H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011), available at 
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/50leg/1r/bills/ 
hb2582p.pdf. 
 207  See id. 
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gaining a foothold in their governments and thereby undermining 
the time-honored concept of separation of church and state.  While 
an initiative like the “Save Our State” Amendment offends both 
constitutional principles and general notions of fairness and justice, 
there should be no reason why states cannot take other steps to 
ensure that their judges apply only secular, domestic law.  The 
Supreme Court has long recognized the states’ broad power to 
develop their respective judiciaries, and if state legislatures view it of 
sufficient importance to pass laws enshrining the supremacy of 
federal and state law in judicial decisions, then they should be 
permitted to do so.  As this Comment demonstrates, states have 
alternatives to the “Save Our State” Amendment that do not suffer 
from the same unconstitutionally discriminatory infirmity and 
achieve essentially the same goal.  This issue is certainly a thorny one 
and the debate will continue to rage on as to whether laws similar to 
the “Save Our State” Amendment are even necessary or advisable, but 
the states’ power to pass non-discriminatory laws that seek to keep 
religion out of their courts should not be up for debate. 
 
